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ABSTRACT 
The relations of the United States and Iran is an actual topic in the field 
of international relations and most research focuses on relations for 
many year. Since latest decision of Donald Trump regarding withdrawal, 
the strategy of Iran against the US policy deserves more attention. Also 
due to its character of being latest and ongoing, this topic forms a 
research gap and this study could provide a new perspective to the 
strategy of Iran. The purpose of the thesis is to evaluate the strategy of 
Iran against the containment policy of the United States and examine it 
in terms of theoretical framework was included bargaining, balancing and 
bandwagoning strategies. 
This research project thus seeks to examine how Iran as a regional 
power copes against the unilateral sanctions of the US. Thesis aimed to 
give theoretical explanation to the strategy of Iran as well, which makes 
project more valuable. 
To start, theoretical framework regarding strategy of states, alliance 
formations will be explained. Following, the historical background of the 
relations between two states will be examined for better understanding 
of current developments. Later, Iran’s foreign policy will be examined to 
explain the strategy against containment policy of the US. In the end, the 
consequences regarding the bargaining power of Iran and its self-
sufficiency will be presented as tools against containment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The relevance of the topic. Given the latest decision of withdrawal from 
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and renewed sanctions 
on Iran by the Trump administration, an assessment of the strategy of 
Iran and current relations, in particular, is needed. 
Certain definitions of previous developments have been traced to identify 
the relationship. Detailed accounting of key events such as the 
involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the 1953 coup 
that overthrew Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq, the Iran 
contra affair, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the subsequent hostage 
crisis in the relationship between Iran and America is not the purpose of 
the thesis. However, it is significant to arrive at a clear understanding of 
the strategies of Iran and America to each other. That is why these events 
have been emphasized briefly with the intention of highlighting the way 
these events have been understood how both sides have shaped each 
country’s perception of the other. 
The United States (The US) has not had a diplomatic presence in Iran 
since 1979 and has had to depend on intelligence and assessment from 
third parties. 
America's interest in the Middle East consist of four main factors.  First, 
energy security upon free flow of oil, as well as preventing the emergence 
of an oil-rich state, such as Iran in the area. Secondly, the nuclear 
proliferation due to it limits their ability to project conventional military 
force. Thirdly, counterterrorism especially after 9/11 in order to prevent 
the emergence of safe spaces for terrorist organizations. Finally, the 
State of Israel's security, which began during the Cold War. They are 
affected, in turn, by Iranian behaviour and influence. 
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Iran's nuclear issue has vexed the global community for decades. The 
withdrawal of the Trump administration in May 2018 from the 2015 
nuclear agreement signed by six world leaders and Iran marked as a 
turning point of recent developments. The US have sought to renegotiate 
a broader, stronger agreement with Iran, limit its nuclear efforts, and what 
Donald Trump says its malignant impact in the region. Washington re-
imposed sanctions as part of a "maximum pressure" campaign to alter 
the behaviour of Tehran with justification of that the agreement did not 
properly restrict Tehran's nuclear program or resolve its missile program, 
human rights abuses, and terror aid. Tensions between Iran and the U.S. 
escalated over tanker attacks in the Gulf of Oman in 2019. This new 
"maximum pressure and negotiation" tactic has very explicit aspects that 
the United States has attempted to enforce, but the consequence and 
the future remain unclear. 
The thesis attempts to describe Iran's strategy against containment 
policy and its resistance to internal stresses and embargoes. Those 
developments helped Iran as a whole develop as a self-sufficient country 
and effectively engage both on the global economy and in politics. 
Significant point is that, nevertheless the JCPOA, newly imposed 
sanctions, any specific American policy or strategy in the region, Iran has 
not reduced its influence or changed its foreign policy path. Although the 
American withdrawal from JCPOA has worsened the financial situation 
of Iran, it led to higher unity in the domestic sphere. 
The hypothesis of the thesis is that if regional powers can reach self-
sufficiency, their bargaining chances with great powers increase. 
As a bargaining chip, Iran uses the nuclear threat in its strategy of 
negotiation. Iran sees the bomb simply the route to get what and where 
it intends, with or without the bomb. As a regional power the ability of Iran 
to cope with pressures shows that, the Trump administration’s strategy 
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is not successful in long term. Moreover, the result may backfire since 
the complicated situation in the Middle East. Therefore, although the 
White House intention regarding that Iran’s oil export should be zero, Iran 
can manage it thanks to smuggling and the temporary waiver granted by 
the U.S. Until recently, Iran pursued a policy to wait out the Trump 
administration, that considering whether one Democratic president was 
elected in 2020 would take the U.S. back to the nuclear agreement. Thus, 
despite the U.S. withdrawal in May 2018, Tehran has mainly complied 
with the JCPOA's limits. When the U.S. doubled down on maximum 
pressure to get expected containment strategy effect, stating that it would 
no longer issue waivers allowing other countries to buy Iranian oil, Iran 
chose to alter the game's rules through its nuclear program. 
Therefore the Iranians have started to move back from some of their 
JCPOA commitments with the objectives of either to place strain on the 
Europeans to offset the U.S. sanctions economically or to place pressure 
on the Trump administration to alleviate its strategy of sanctions. 
Another issue is that, it could be risky for the safety of the Persian Gulf 
whether Iran's oil exports are decreased to zero. Of course, the possibility 
of secret transactions with Iraq, Russia and China could not be ignored. 
Two consequences in the Gulf, Iranian nuclear weapons development, 
or a war with Iran are worrying Western leaders. Making both 
results more probable, Iran seemingly hopes to force U.S. and European 
leaders to reconsider their strategies and figure out ways out of the 
escalating conflict. 
Moreover, Iran has chosen to reform its budget structure and has realized 
that it should not be so reliant on oil throughout its history. Sanctions 
could be viewed as a chance for Iran, according to recent developments 
in Iran's self-sufficiency level. Structural reforms and prevention of 
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corruption seem to be the best way to stop the economic situation from 
deteriorating. 
The purpose of the thesis is to evaluate the strategy of Iran against the 
containment policy of the United States and examine it in terms of 
theoretical framework was included bargaining, balancing and 
bandwagoning strategies. Therefore, the questions can be raised: 
- How does Iran as a regional power cope against the unilateral sanctions 
of the US? 
More sub-questions that are specific are: 
- To what extent Iran’s self-sufficiency help to encounter with 
sanctions? 
- How does Iran use its bargaining chance to encounter against 
sanctions? 
Tasks of the thesis. For achieving the goals, which set in work, it was 
necessary to solve the following tasks: 
- To identify substantial consequences of the rise of regional powers 
in terms of theoretical framework 
- To distinguish alliance formations of balancing, bandwagoning, 
bargaining and to examine which one of them is appropriate in 
which situations. 
- In order to great understanding and analysing strategy of Iran 
against US policy, to examine the historical background 
- To study the reasons behind Islamic Revolution of 1979, and 
evaluate hostile relations of post-revolutionary Islamic state and 
America. 
- To identify the beginning of the containment policy of the United 
States in the framework of dual containment policy 
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- To trace the events which lead to reconciliation under the name of 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. 
- To examine foreign policy of Iran after the withdrawal of the United 
States from nuclear deal on May 2018. 
Research novelty.  An analysis of the literature in this topic shows that 
there are a number of works in the world dedicated to the issue of 
relations of The US and Iran, their historical background, Islamic 
Revolution of 1979, the consequences of Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action, etc. However, the research on the strategy of Iran against 
containment policy of the United States lacks critical investigation due to 
its character of being latest and ongoing. The research attempts to study 
the topic from the literature of both sides and daily latest news in order to 
bring clear and thoroughly information. I have also attempted to 
developed theoretical approach to behaviours and strategies of regional 
powers in terms of Iran and the United States relations.  From this point 
of view, the scientific novelty of this work is determined. 
Analyses of the literature: 
A number of works have been published on US-Iran relations, the Islamic 
revolution of 1979, Iran’s nuclear ambitions and many scholars have 
written about these historic events. Most articles and work cover the 
relations of the US and Iran, in general. However more specific work on 
the strategy of Iran against containment policy of the US, especially after 
the withdrawal of Trump from nuclear deal is rare to be found due to its 
character of being latest and ongoing. Therefore, literature about the 
strategy of Iran after the fall of nuclear deal is uncommon.  Robin Wright’s 
article “The origins and future of the Iran Crisis” (2019) foregrounds 
where the crisis between the U.S. and Iran is headed and how tensions 
between the U.S. and Iran have reached this crisis point. The book “The 
origins of alliances”(1985) written by Stephen M. Waltz helps to 
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understand the strategy of states in the case of foreign threat, however  
also used in order to give a theoretical basis to Iran’s strategy against 
containment policy. However, in that book little attention was given to the 
bargaining as a policy. 
Fozia Jan’s article “Iran towards self-sufficiency” (2016) covers Iran’s 
strategy from the internal perspective. Sarhang Hamasaeed’s article 
“Iran looks to shore up its influence in Iraq” (2019) and website 
assessments of Stratfor Enterprises “Iran’s strategy for surviving U.S. 
sanctions” covers Iran’s strategy from the external perspective. 
The deficiency of these literatures is their character of being informative 
rather than analytic. Another gap is that the broad analysis of strategy of 
Iran in terms of both internal and external policy is rare. Critical and 
comparative analysis of Iran’s strategy both foreign and domestic against 
the containment policy of the US has been explained with theoretical 
framework in this thesis, which could contribute to closing that gap. 
Methodology of thesis. The paper uses qualitative research to 
understand the main aspects of the strategy of Iran against containment 
policy of the United States and current ongoing developments. 
Therefore, study examined a number of books, scholarly articles and 
research, and internet materials, especially latest news regarding the 
thesis topic which is enough actual. I have tried focus on more 
contemporary issues of US-Iran relations, however in order to better 
understanding of current developments, I have examined and wrote the 
previous events which have great impact on current regards of states 
towards each other. The first and second chapters are mainly based on 
books due to great amounts of books on historical background of the US 
and Iran, events such as 1951 CIA coup, Shah Regime, 1979 Islamic 
Revolution, hostage crisis, comprehensive nuclear agreement. 
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However the lack of books on contemporary relations and events, there 
are enough materials and daily news on internet which helped me to 
broadly analyse and understand the relations of the US-Iran, strategies 
of both sides especially on nuclear deal issue, and foreign policy of Iran. 
The structure of the thesis. The structure of the thesis is determined by 
the purpose and objectives of the study. The work consists of an 
introduction, three chapters (included a total six sub-chapters) conclusion 
and references. 
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I CHAPTER. Theoretical Framework 
1.1. Regional and Great Powers in Power Games 
Great powers refer to the countries which differ from others with their 
power. In general, great powers occupy a leading position in the 
international sphere due to their sources wealth, the types of armed 
forces they build. Regional powers may be the most powerful countries 
in their particular region, but not globally. The reason behind this is acting 
of great powers in conjunction with their smaller neighbours to prevent 
this. So, the requirement for being a global great power is having both 
the will and the capacity to advance and defend one’s interests on a 
worldwide basis. The theory asserts a hierarchical international system 
with a leading power at the top and great powers, middle powers and 
small powers subordinated. 
In fact, great powers can be differentiated by the criteria that they can 
only be defeated militarily by another great power and they also seek to 
express a global view that is centred on national interests far from their 
home territories. The great powers commonly have the greatest military 
forces in the world and the greatest economies to pay for military 
forces and other energy capacities. These huge economies, in fact, are 
based on certain mixture of large populations, extensive natural 
resources, sophisticated technology, and qualified labour forces. (Joshua 
S. Goldstein and Job C. Pevehouse, 2014, pp. 49-62) 
As one of the original founders of neorealism, Kenneth Waltz’s claim “the 
story of international relations is written in terms of great powers of an 
era”. (Temperley, 1936, p. 44) The issue with this explanation is that 
this viewpoint does not donate the importance of regional powers, and 
the moment of great and regional powers interactions. For example, 
some regional powers can be seen as potential great powers over time. 
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The gradual evolution of the US, the rapid transformation of Japan into a 
massive empire is the real proofs of this argument. Lately, China has 
been on the headlines of media as a rising power. Looking further, India 
also has the potential for transforming to great power. 
Waltz claims that the anarchical character of international politics implies 
countries must behave in a manner that guarantees their safety above 
all else, or risk falling behind. (Montgomery, Evan Braden, 2016, p. 5) 
Of course, not all regional powers have what it takes to end up a pole in 
the international order. Even still, they are often “pivotal states” 
that determine the stability and security of their neighbourhoods. Thus, 
they can discover themselves in the crosshairs of exquisite powers that 
are searching to shield their interests, preserve their influence, 
or enhance their role relative to other outside actors. This 
is especially proper when the local distribution of electricity is in flux and 
warfare breaks out. If a rising strength in a peripheral vicinity challenges 
the status quo, then excellent powers in widely wide-spread and 
the leading country in specific have to decide how to respond—
a choice that can determine the future of that vicinity and, in some cases, 
the global machine as a whole. (Montgomery, Evan Braden, 2016, pp. 
12-16) 
Although the scarcity of research, attempts to explain why established 
great powers accommodate or oppose rising regional powers, there is no 
scarcity of research on how they manipulate the rise of peer competitors, 
most of which can be observed within the realistic camp. Although their 
heavy similarities, different versions of realism highlight contrasting 
positions on several core issues, such as whether or not the ordering 
principle of global politics is anarchy or hierarchy, and whether parity 
between nations is a deterrent to hostilities or an integral circumstance 
of war. Thus, the two major theory-balance schools of power realism and 
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power realism preponderance highlight a wide variety of arguments that 
show how great powers react when global power shifts occur. 
The rise of regional powers can have substantial consequences both 
locally and globally. The most significant statements can be briefly 
summarized. If a main state has little reason to worry about taking over 
a peripheral area by means of a local actor or an external power, then it 
must no longer have a strong preference when it comes to the kind of 
order that exists there. The rise and fall of the states are one of the 
significant developments which directly affect the current international 
relations and status quo. A rising power may challenge the reigning order 
by demanding status and benefits relative to its power. It will try to 
reshape the existing standards, rules, and order by initiating conflict 
against established great powers. 
First of all, a rising power may undermine and perhaps overturn the 
status quo in its neighbourhood to its own preference.  At this moment, 
established great power directly pay consideration and might even 
intervene in the case whether they conclude that the changes taking 
place assist or damage them in some way. In here the key point is related 
with the will of rising power. First step to understand regional and great 
powers’ behaviour in power game is directly related whether a leading 
state favours regional parity, whether it favours regional primacy, or 
whether it is impartial between these alternative orders. The assessment 
of certain risks, in particularly the risk of access denial and the risk of 
containment failure should be taken into consideration by a leading state 
while determining its preferences. In the case of both of them is low, a 
leading state will favour impartiality, because main interest is preserving 
local stability and preventing any regional conflict that can happen. A 
leading state will prefer regional parity if it worried that a local actor might 
restrict the presence of outside powers in its neighbourhood. Finally, if 
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a leading state is concerned about the prospect of exterior intervention, 
then it should have a choice for regional primacy rather parity or 
impartiality. (Montgomery, Evan Braden, 2016, pp. 20-22) 
Regional power is an actor whose power significantly different than other 
actors within the same region and it varies from others with its leadership 
role within the region. Detlef Nolte claimed in his scholarly article, that 
regional powers deploy their impact with cooperation. 
What about Iran ambitions for regional supremacy?  From a neorealist 
point of view, Iran's possibility of being a nuclear power is simply 
acceptable if not desirable. There are several elements which give the 
country the potential for being major player in the region. In the case of 
Iran these elements are its geographical location which makes country 
strategically important, its oil and gas reserves of the Persian Gulf and 
the Caspian Sea total over 60% of the global oil and gas reserves. Since 
the revolution, Iran has cut its diplomatic ties with the US and favour 
“Eastward” orientated political stance. Historically, Iran has had 
significant relations with several countries in Central Asia. 
These relations have taken a new shape after revolution, making closer 
linkages with the East in arrange for Iran to set up itself as a regional 
power. Subsequently, on Iran’s approach to the Indian Ocean Region is 
crucial. The Islamic Republic has intent to turn Iran into a regional player 
by acquiring nuclear energy and make country self-sufficient. (Farhang 
Morady, 2011, pp. 5-6) 
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1.2. Balancing, Bandwagoning or Bargaining? 
The study of international relations mainly focuses relations between 
states. Historically, the state was a security arrangement and now it 
maintains that element actual. 
In international relations, the most central issue of states which is the 
main topics of debates is ensuring their own security. As Thomas Hobbes 
claimed, without security ‘there is no place for industry… no arts, no 
letters, no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of 
violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’ 
(Thomas Hobs, 1651, p. 78) 
Why the concept of security is so essential?  It is obvious that human 
beings can enjoy the advantages of living in society together with others 
without any risk. Isolated Robinson Crusoe lived in highly secured 
conditions because there is nobody to create danger. For that security, 
there should be no interaction, no communication and no cooperation 
which is impossible for contemporary era. This explanation is true for 
state interactions as well.  As a result, security is a core value of 
international relations. Of course, it is obvious that states can never be 
completely safe. That is why security policies are crucial. 
For preserving security there are several ways. One of them is using 
diplomacy to strengthen alliances and isolate threats. 
Generally, alliances can be seen as a response to threats. Stephan Walt 
in his book titled “Origins of alliances” touched to that issue of alignment. 
He highlighted two types of alliance formation: balancing and 
bandwagoning. Balancing refers to ally in opposition to the principal 
source of danger. Bandwagoning refers to ally with the state that poses 
the major threat. S. Waltz claims that since aggressors will face 
combined opposition in the case of balancing, states are more secure if 
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balancing is more common.  Vice versa, security is scarce due to 
aggressors are rewarded if bandwagoning outweigh balancing. (Stephen 
M. Walt, 1985, pp. 155-167) 
If balancing is more common than bandwagoning, then states are more 
secure because aggressors will face combined opposition. Status quo 
states should therefore avoid provoking countervailing coalitions by 
eschewing threatening foreign and defence policies. But if bandwagoning 
is the dominant tendency, then security is scarce because aggression is 
rewarded. A more belligerent foreign policy and a more capable military 
establishment are the logical policy choices. Although both of these 
hypotheses have been examined by scholars and embraced by 
statesmen. 
Balancing as an alliance formation lies to the traditional balance of power 
theory of realism.  According to this hypothesis, states create alliances in 
order to avoid thread posed by stronger powers. One of the main logic 
behind balancing is that states should restrain a potential hegemon 
before it becomes too strong in order to preserve their own survival. 
Allying with the dominant power implies putting one’s trust in one’s 
benevolence. The safer strategy is to join those who cannot easily 
dominate their allies rather those who can. 
Similarly, Henry Kissinger thought it was better to align with the weaker 
side and respectively supported rapprochement with China rather than 
Soviet Union. Another main logic behind balancing is about the new 
member’s influence. What does it means? Since the weaker side has a 
need for assistance, it will increase the new member’s influence. Due to 
it adds relatively less to the coalition, joining the stronger side, relatively 
reduces the new member’s influence.  Therefore, H. Kissinger came to 
conclusion regarding alignment that it would better to ally with weaker 
side. 
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Balancing as a formation of state alignment based on theory of balance 
of power. The balance of power is one of the oldest and most significant 
concepts in international relations theory. While there are many 
variations in balance of power theory and interpretations of this concept, 
they are all based on the minimum of a tendency and the maximum of a 
law’s recurring equilibrium model. This concept based on the guarantee 
of the survival of major powers in the international system through 
restoring equilibrium among actors. According to this model, equilibrium 
is restored by checking imbalances and concentrations in military and 
material capabilities among the great powers. In order to restore the 
balance, there are several mechanisms of great powers such as inner 
military build-up where economic wealth is transformed into military 
force, the development of counterbalancing alliances, the transfer of 
equilibrium to another state, the partition and compensation in post-war 
peace settlements, and emulation. But, several research on alignment 
issue highlight secondary states are more willing to bandwagon or join 
with more powerful state or alliances of states rather than balance 
against it. 
As structural realism, developed by Kenneth Waltz in Theory of 
International Politics, the anarchic self-help system and variations in the 
relative distributions of capabilities imply that balance of power is 
recurring in the international system. The distribution of capabilities 
among the great powers affects balancing of states. In bipolar power 
distributions (2 major powers) countries will balance through inner 
military buildup rather by forming counterbalancing alliances which 
happens in multipolar power distributions. (Kenneth N. Waltz, 1979, pp. 
145-147) Subsequently, John Mearsheimer-an American political 
scientist and international relations scholar claimed that the responsibility 
of balancing is probable to transfer the buck of balancing to a “buck 
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catcher” in balanced multipolar distributions of power. (John 
Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 157) Currently, in the somehow unipolar 
distribution of power, several academics assert that countries engage in 
soft balancing and leash slipping instead of traditional hard balancing. 
One the other hand, some scholars argue that there is no balance and 
that the imbalanced or unipolar distribution is both stable and durable. 
Balance of power politics has deeply affected international relations since 
the 16th century. But in latest years with the sudden demise of the Soviet 
Union, growing U.S. authority, and increasing global institutions' 
prominence many academics have asserted that the theory of 
equilibrium of power is losing its significance. 
As mentioned, a key tenet of both classical and neorealist theory is the 
balance of power theory that aims to offer a logical explanation to the 
alliance formation. According to neorealist idea, which emphasize the 
international system as anarchic, through maintaining and increasing 
their capabilities both defensive and offensive states can achieve their 
own survival in a self-help system. For suppressing the event of attack 
by hegemon and arise of potential hegemon, states should balance 
against potential hegemon. According to Kenneth Waltz, founder of 
neorealism, "balance-of-power politics prevail wherever two, and only 
two requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be 
populated by units wishing to survive". This can be done by two ways: 
“internal balancing” and “external balancing”. “Internal balancing” refers 
that a states utilize inner initiatives such as financial capacity-building, 
smart strategies and increased military power. Respectively, "external 
balancing" refers forming allies to improve their safety. (Kenneth N. 
Waltz, 1979, pp. 168-175) 
The balance of threat theory developed by Stephen M. Walt in 1985 is a 
branch of balancing and explains the reason behind balancing with the 
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threat. Differ from the traditional balance of power theorists, this theory 
place balance against threat rather than against power alone. Stephan 
Walt does not claim that the balance of power theory wrong, but 
incomplete. He also highlights the significance of power that affects 
balancing but argues that power is not the mere factor. Since 
bandwagoning placing trust to the aggressors’ benevolence, realists 
favour balancing rather bandwagoning. Stephan Walt claims, states 
might choose balancing in peacetime, but whether they are on the losing 
side, they can bandwagon in order to “sharing gains of victory”. (Stephen 
M. Walt, 1985, p. 157) 
Bandwagoning as an alliance formation refers to ally with rather than 
against the hegemon side. More recently, American foreign policy 
commitments are justified with that bandwagoning hypothesis. John F. 
Kennedy claimed that "if the United States were to falter, the whole world 
... would inevitably begin to move toward the Communist bloc. 
Respectively, Ronald Reagan supported the same beliefs: “if we cannot 
defend ourselves [in Central America] . . . then we cannot expect to 
prevail elsewhere.  ... Our credibility will collapse and our alliances will 
crumble.” (The New York Times , 1983) Generally, this hypothesis 
reveals a common belief which is that states are attracted to strength. It 
means much stronger the state is, much other states are willing to ally. 
Balancing and bandwagoning are usually considered in terms of power 
factor. The common view is that balancing is alignment with the weaker 
side, bandwagoning is alignment with stronger. This point of view ignores 
other factors which affect alignment. Power is not the only element in 
statesmen’s calculations. The level of threat is also a vital element which 
should be taken into consideration while balancing and bandwagoning. 
The impact of aggregate power, proximity, offensive capabilities and 
offensive intentions to the threat is important to consider. 
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There is a hypothesis regarding bandwagoning is that small states 
bordering with great powers may be so prone to the bandwagon. 
(Stephen M.Walt, 1985, pp. 179-181) 
In the theory of international relations, the war bargaining model is a 
means of representing potential profits and losses and the final outcome 
of conflict between two parties as a bargaining exchange. Bargaining as 
mutual efforts to impact others and an activity of power includes two or 
more sides, each attempting to affect the other more than it is affected 
by itself. Bargaining can be described as tacit or direct interaction in an 
effort to achieve agreement on an exchange of value— that is, tangible 
or intangible objects that are valued by one or both sides. The 
agreements as a result of bargaining process do not necessarily imply a 
fair exchange of value; many deals are clearly one-sided and unfair. But 
in broad view, bargaining whether fair or unfair contains an element of 
mutual benefit. Therefore, bargaining is described as an interaction 
where no one actor can profit without another experiencing a loss. 
Thomas Schelling's deterrence model argued that military strategy was 
now equally, if not more, the art of coercion, intimidation, and deterrence. 
Schelling suggests the ability to hurt another state is now being used as 
a motivating factor (bargaining chip) for other countries to prevent it and 
impact the conduct of another state. The use of force to hurt as a 
bargaining power can be defined as the grounds of the deterrence theory. 
(Schelling, 1966, pp. 25-27) 
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II CHAPTER. United States-Iran relations 
2.1. Relations before Iranian Revolution of 1979 
Iran which was known Persia until 1935 and one of the greatest empires 
of ancient world was regarded by several scholars as the heartland of 
west Asia due to its unique location. Its geostrategic location between the 
Caucasus and the Indian Ocean gives access to more than one route to 
trade, people-to-people movement and much more. (Ervand 
Abrahamian, 2008, p. 56) 
Iran, as many analysts acknowledge, has the potential to become the 
regional hegemon. Its shoreline dominates the northern coast of the 
Persian Gulf with a land of 1,648,195 sq. km, making it the eighteenth 
largest country in the globe. (Alex Edwards , 2014, p. 36) 
Historically, Iran has been distinct from its neighbours with regard of its 
religious and often in confrontation with them. 
Before the World War I, Iran, which was known as Persia, was under 
pressure of contenting British and Russian empires due to the desire of 
those empires to check the influence of their rival. Therefore, this 
consideration prevented Persia’s integrity and independence. 1921 coup 
d’état led by Reza Khan, who was backed by Britain, brought a new 
government with a British influence. 
The relations of the United States and Iran (Persia) first established with 
the treaty of Commerce and Friendship in 1856 and diplomatic relations 
initiated in 1883. American influence in region was limited before the 
WWII. During the war, British and Soviet Russia continued to exert 
influence on Reza Khan due to he tried to modernize Persia, which 
named as Iran in 1935 and his pro-German sympathies. Throughout the 
war interest of the United States on region rapidly increased because of 
Iran’s massive oil reserves. 
- 24 - 
 
The issue of access to oil for the sustainability of Western economies 
intersects with the containment strategy made Iran a significant state in 
the eyes of the United States. Historian Mark Lytle has identified four 
main factors, which reflect US interests in Iran at that moment,: “the 
desire for secure Middle Eastern oil reserves, the State Department’s 
efforts to incorporate Iran into a new conception of American security, the 
department’s long-term efforts to contain the Soviet Union, and the faith 
in American exceptionalism.” (Ben Offiler, 2015, p. 18) 
The Soviets desire was increase their influence on region due to gain 
access to untapped oil resources in northern Iran as well. Historian Galia 
Golan explains Moscow’s strategy toward Iran as an attempt to expand 
Soviet impact on its periphery. ( Galia Golan, 1990) 
Firstly, US personnel entered Iran for maintaining the flow of wartime 
material aid to the Soviet Union. During the period of containing Soviet 
Russia in Cold war, Truman administration initiated diplomatic pressure 
on Russia for its withdrawal. Since Iran sought for way to run away from 
Russian influence, it opened its door to American assistance. 
In the developing informal anti-Soviet alliance in the Middle East, the 
Truman administration welcomed Mohammed Reza Pahlavi as an 
important partner as the Cold War heated up in the late 1940s. However, 
this partnership complicated by raising Iranian resentment towards 
Britain and Anglo-Iran Oil Company (AIOC). The reason behind it was 
that Iran nearly getting nothing from enormous profits, which came from 
exportation millions of barrels of oil. 
From 1941 to 1953, there was a confrontation between different political 
forces seeking to map Iran’s national identity. ( Kumuda Simpson, 2016) 
Iranian officials also believed that the United States could serve as a 
safeguard against British involvement in Iran, heavily affected by AIOC. 
Conservative government of Britain government under Churchill 
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supported American involvement in Iran because he considered it was 
necessary to prevent Iran from Soviet influence. The Middle East had 
been of strategic interest of the United States prior to the war for its 
having resource-rich factor. In addition, relationship with Iran gained vital 
importance especially in the context of Cold war. 
Common complaints by Iran against the United States were its 
interference to Iran’s internal affairs in pursuit of its own interests, which 
did often result in Iranian interests exploited and sacrificed. An 
outstanding example of this is American participation in the 1953 coup, 
which led to the fall of democratic Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad 
Mosaddeq’s government. The election of Mossadeq as Prime Minister in 
April 1951 played a vital role at the nationalization movement (Reza 
Ghasimi, 2011, pp. 445-446) So that, Britain gained support of the United 
States in order to drive Mossadeq from power due to its decision to 
nationalize AIOC assets in Iran.  The essence of this combined operation 
during August 1953 was British and American oil interests in Iran and 
growing nationalist movement there. During his term in parliament, Prime 
Minister Mossadeq had achieved substantial gains towards democracy. 
He tried to weaken the powers of the unconstitutional monarchy and 
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, and sought reforms in education, 
elections and law. (Abrahamian E, 1982) In the sense of the Cold War, 
US interventionism was largely justified; nevertheless, its influence on 
Iran over time has decoupled from its Cold War context and instead seen 
as evidence of American arrogance and disrespect for the Iranian state. 
( Kumuda Simpson, 2016) 
Without a question, 1953 U.S. involvement in Iran is the most significant 
example of U.S. action to bring about regime change in the region. As a 
result, of this coup Shah came to power that rewarded the United States 
granting oil concessions to US firm. Shah also had a reason for 
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requesting American military aid and training for his intelligence service-
SAVAK due to the Soviet threat. In the perspective of the US, Shah 
Regime was good enough at containing Soviet influence in the Middle 
East; moreover, energy needs of America and defence of Israel fulfilled 
by Iran. During that time, that level of relationship only satisfied US, Israel 
and Shah, it did little to benefit the majority of the Iranian population. The 
Shah created SAVAK in 1957, in order to preserve its power by 
systematically suppressing all opposition, imprisoning and torturing 
thousands of anti-Pahlavi militants with the assistance of the CIA. The 
Shah used to terrorize people who opposed him with SAVAK. In the early 
1960s, Iran allied with Israel under American auspices participated to 
containment policy of the US. 
Shah also initiated social and economic reforms in order to Westernize 
Iran in the early 1960s under the banner of the ‘White Revolution’. Those 
reforms caused increasing resentment from Shiite clerics and the landed 
aristocracy. Those increased opposition to the Shah caused great 
campaign against regime, which driven by both religious and patriotic 
sensibilities under its leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The reasons 
behind resentments of Khomeini were Shah, his reforms under White 
Revolution and associated Western secularist policies. (Greg Ryan, 
2018) 
American officials paid little attention to the rise of oppositions. Over 5000 
incomplete USAID projects in Iran detected by the US government 
investigation of aid to Iran during this era, referring to corruption and the 
government of Shah’s apparent unwillingness to engage in social reform. 
(Ehsani Nia Sara, 2011) 
In the years of 1960s, dozens of demonstrations against Shah Regime 
was held by, the Iranian Students Association (ISA), alongside other 
predominantly leftist student groups.  The protestors were significantly 
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critical on the nature of the US-Iranian relationship, claiming that 
Washington's assistance for the Shah helped boost the Pahlavi 
autocracy and undermined basic political freedoms in Iran. (Ben Offiler, 
2015, pp. 75-76) 
While Shah Regime had not well managed American aid to Iran in the 
1950s and 1960s, the administrations of Eisenhower, Kennedy, and 
Johnson were unwilling on satisfying many of the Shah's demands 
regarding increased military aid and advanced weapons systems. 
Although the US saw Iran as its ally, its foreign policy prioritized Europe 
and Asia rather the Middle East in which Britain still played an important 
role in maintaining stability. American and British leaders relied on the 
dependence of Iran regime from them and did not necessarily take the 
Shah seriously since they had installed Shah (twice) and he appeared to 
be dependent on them. 
The assassination of Kennedy in November 1963 shocked both 
American and Iranian society, and in order to relieve both sides ' anxiety 
Lyndon Johnson who served as America's 36th president attempted 
pursuing his predecessor's course. The strategic importance of Iran and 
its internal stability were again the main concerns of the new 
administration. In order to gain some control over the Shah and to keep 
it closely aligned with the West, The US was interested to maintain good 
relations with Iran through economic and military assistance. 
During the Johnson administration, the actions of non-state actors 
significantly affected US-Iranian relations. Student groups, including the 
ISA and the recently organized Transnational Confederation of Iranian 
Students National Union (CISNU), started protesting against the military 
and political relationship between Washington and Iran. In addition, the 
Johnson administration rejected the lawful demands of the Iranian mass 
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protest movement by concentrating on the military sales aspect of US-
Iranian relations. 
However, this scenario started to alter by the late 1960s with the 
announcement of the intention of London regarding the withdrawal of 
British military forces in 1971 from the Persian Gulf due to the Second 
World War, therefore the economic recession in Britain. Britain's 
presence in the Gulf led to increasing Western reliance on Middle 
Eastern oil, meaning Iran's role in keeping stability had been becoming 
more and more crucial. 
Us-Iran relations in the last 2 years of the Johnson administration contain 
several problems since several developments within Middle East. The 
six-day war between Israel and its Arab neighbours in 1967, withdrawal 
of British military forces from east of Suez caused significant political 
change in the Middle East. However, both of these developments were 
the favour of the Shah’s confidence that growing on foreign policy 
question. Alongside with these regional developments, the economic aid 
of the United States toward Iran ceased in 1967, and this in his turn 
resulted with a new dimension of the US-Iran relation. Military supply 
arrangement of the US with Iran gained importance as a bargaining tool 
with the loss of economic aid assistance. The Johnson administration's 
choice to agree to a five-year loan agreement in 1968 laid the strategy of 
offering comprehensive credit assistance to support Washington's 
diminishing impact on the Shah in stone. Tehran had become an 
increasingly vital component of the Middle East policy of Washington 
since its supporting US policy in the six-day war. 
As tensions between Arab and Israel escalated before the October War 
of 1973, the Shah exerted his impact in OPEC to boost oil prices. The 
mixture of flush financial moments and strategic circumstances meant 
that the Shah had the means to purchase advanced guns and a 
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persuasive rationale for being able to purchase them. Arms sales to Iran 
increased dramatically during the Nixon administration, as the Shah 
bought about $10 billion worth of U.S. weapons during Nixon's first term. 
This was another example of the Shah and the United States consorting 
to assist each other while ignoring the requirements of the wide Iranian 
population. (William R Polk, 2009, pp. 65-67) 
After the withdrawal of British military forces from Persian Gulf in 1971, 
Shah gained opportunity for exercising power in region. Indeed, he 
claimed sovereignty over the strategically important area in the Strait of 
Hormuz regardless of dissatisfaction of Saudi Arabia, another important 
American ally. (Ben Offiler, 2015, p. 149) 
Nixon had to depend on local allies like Iran, which the perfect candidate 
for shortening American interests in the region since the withdrawal of 
British troops. Consequently, Nixon’s policy towards Iran could be 
perceived as a continuation–and the expansion–of the policies adopted 
by the Johnson administration. 
During the reign of the Shah, Iran initiated a series of innovative nuclear 
projects relying on US and European support. According to Akbar 
Etemad, President of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization (AEOI) from 
1971 to 1978, Iran was already pursuing nuclear research and education 
at the University of Tehran when the NPT entered into force on March 5, 
1970. According to Etemad, Iran implemented a comprehensive nuclear 
energy program by the mid-1970s. Etemad adds that Iran's indigenous 
work on the nuclear fuel cycle in the 1970s, including plans for a new 
Isfahan nuclear research centre and exploration of the mining and 
processing of uranium. (Fozia Jan, 3 April 2016, pp. 99-101) 
Consequently, 1953 countercoup in Iranian history had been assessing 
as a cause of the 1979 Iranian revolution by some critiques. The 
prevailing opinion runs something like this: The US intervened the Iranian 
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internal policy, operated against famous nationalist leader-Mossadeq 
and helped set up the corrupt regime of the shah. Therefore, it should be 
said the United States and the Shah led the 1979 Iranian revolution. To 
put it simply, revolution was made by 1953 as revenge. (Camille 
Alexander and T. J. Lennon, 2004, p. 144) 
In October 1977, demonstrations against the Shah Regime backed The 
United States commenced as a civil resistance campaign containing both 
religious and secular components. 1979 Iranian Revolution refers to a 
number of events, which paved the way to overthrow of the last monarch 
of Iran, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and replacement of Shah 
Regime with the Islamic Republic under Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini. Various leftist and Islamist organizations and student 
movements backed the intensified campaign against the government in 
1978. In Tabriz, Teheran, and Isfahan, a sequence of protests 
transformed the social unrest into political upheaval. The Shah sent 
forces in an attempt to settle the protest after several students died during 
one strike. The Shah pledged more reforms under force from Western 
countries; however, the people intended instant shift that the state was 
unable to implement. Tensions began to rise until the beginning of a 
revolution in August 1978. 
Although Khomeini's movement started as a religious movement, the 
financial, social and cultural modifications in Iran ultimately led to the 
collapse of the Pahlavi political system and ultimately to the abolition of 
the monarchy. 
Khomeini started to shift from religious leader to political leader during 
this era of extensive discontent. As an agitator, he provoked the clergy's 
youthful and fanatical participants against Westernization in opposition 
to the monarchy and rebellion. Khomeini used religion to de-stabilize the 
Shah's regime to further his objectives. Young individuals and others 
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became unhappy with the government of the Shah when pressures 
intensified. Moreover, they started fully acknowledging the legitimacy of 
Khomeini. 
On January 16, 1979, the Shah left Iran for Egypt putting to an end the 
Pahlavi era of government. Governments welcomed Ayatollah Khomeini 
back to Iran and introduced him to official power with greetings from 
several million Iranians. Islamic republic formed by national referendum 
on 1 April 1979 whereby Khomeini became the country’s Supreme 
Leader on December 1979. 
Historically known hostage crisis (longest hostage crisis in recorded 
history) occurred on 4 November 1979, which lasted until January 1981 
as a support to Iranian Revolution. So that, a student group took over the 
American Embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and held 52 Americans 
hostage for 444 days. Iran justified its action against America by 
attempting to undermine the Iranian Revolution and by supporting the 
Shah of Iran, Reza Pahlavi. America, in turn, evaluated hostage crisis as 
terrorism and infringement of the core principles of international law, such 
as the Vienna Convention, which gave diplomats immunity from 
detention and rendered diplomatic compounds inviolable. 
Indeed, the hostage crisis has played a vital role in affecting the opinions 
of Iranian motives and intentions. The incident has become a defining 
point in the revolution and was profoundly embarrassing for America. 
Khomeini proclaimed his backing for carrying the hostage and used this 
event as his favour for strengthening his own authority. These 
developments caused American impotence and resentment towards the 
new Islamic government in Iran and influenced the perception and 
understanding of Iran by America. Therefore, it is certainly the reason the 
U.S. and Iran have no relations.  ( Kumuda Simpson, 2016, pp. 13-19) 
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In Iran, the crisis reinforces the new Supreme Leader, Khomeini’s 
reputation and the political powers who were against westernization. The 
US launched economic sanctions against Iran after the crisis, which 
further deteriorated relations of two countries. New Islamic regime in Iran 
placed a new foreign policy, which paved the way to war with its 
neighbour and ongoing conflict with the West. (Aljazeera, 2019) 
The Revolution came about at a moment when the Shah's regime was 
regarded one of the Middle East's most stable governments and caused 
put an end to 2,500 years of monarchy by a religious leader. The U.S. 
administration observed the fall of the Shah's government helplessly. 
Thus, the revolution finished half a century of U.S. involvement in the 
state. (Daneshvar, 1996, p. 8) 
Since Sunni Arabs have historically dominated the other Persian Gulf 
states (politically, demographically, or both), Iran is linguistically, 
ethnically, religiously, and socially distinct and is dominated by Persian 
Shia. (Andrew Cockburn and Patrick Cockburn, 2002, p. 59) So that, 
post-revolution Iran posed danger to Iraq due to both its Shia majority 
and mutual borders, and to Saudi Arabia since it undermined the 
governing dynasty's legitimacy. 
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2.2 Iran-US relations after 1979 –Dual containment 
The post-revolutionary government in Iran fundamentally changed its 
foreign and domestic policy, therefore started to promote global Ummah 
and strengthen relations with Islamic countries. The new regime returned 
to “fundamentalism” or “traditionalism” was in favour of security 
encompassing only the countries of the Persian Gulf region and not 
foreign powers. “Neither east nor west” was the primary slogan of the 
new government with emphasis on spirituality, religious belief. The 
United States lost on the greatest allies in the Middle East after Israel 
due to the defeat of the Shah regime. 
Generally, the Iranian Revolution caused huge instability in a region that 
had remained comparatively stable under the Shah's rule. The new 
government was well conscious of the significance of oil to the state, both 
for Iran and for the region as a whole. The reality was that oil had to be 
produced and exported from a region that became the centre of political 
instability. The Iranian Revolution and its outcome produced huge 
instability in a portion of a region that had remained comparatively stable 
under the Shah's rule. (Farhang Morady, 2011, pp. 11-13) 
After the revolution, the Khomeini period was characterized by a troubled 
time of revolutionary extremes that included killing supporters of the 
ancient regime, taking foreigners hostage, and promoting zealotry across 
the Islamic world. The turmoil has been exacerbated by an eight-year 
war with Iraq that has become the bloodiest contemporary conflict in the 
Middle East. This caused more than one million losses (deaths and 
injuries). Iran has been commonly regarded as a global pariah 
throughout the first decade of the revolution. (Robin Wright, February 4, 
2019) 
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Since the Islamic Revolution and the takeover of the American Embassy 
in Tehran four decades ago, the possibility for armed conflict between 
the two states has emerged. The Iranian revolution, followed by the 
hostage crisis, and the increase of anti-American administrative rule 
further enhanced Iran's consciousness as a global challenge to US 
interests. 
Shortly after the revolution, the United States launched unilateral 
sanctions against Iran, which were the first United States sanction by 
President Carter in November 1979 and lasted throughout the Iran-Iraq 
war. Many of the sanctions enforced during this era were designed to 
stop Iran from winning the war against Hussein's Iraq. Nevertheless, it 
was also expected that sanctions would lead to common discontent in 
Iran, and in its turn it would pave the way defeating of the new 
government. Such sanctions persisted and worsened even more, 
especially in the 1990s, after the Iran-Iraq war. (Greg Ryan, 2018, pp. 
23-25) 
The US sought to keep relations with the interim government before the 
embassy seizure and the following hostage crisis. In view of the fact that 
Iranian revolutionaries detained the American diplomatic contingent, 
President Carter did break diplomatic relations with Iran on April 7, 1980, 
since it became apparent that there was no near-term solution to the 
crisis. Obviously, the members of the Islamic Revolution proved their own 
flagrant contempt for diplomatic exercise and made a powerful 
contribution to the politicization of the Iran question in the United States 
by breaking international law and taking up the Tehran embassy. 
In April 1980, under immense pressure during an election year to settle 
the hostage crisis, President Carter ordered a military mission (Operation 
Desert Claw) from a U.S. aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf to try to 
rescue American hostages in the Tehran embassy. The aircraft carrying 
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out the operation never reached Tehran, and in a refuelling accident in 
the Iranian desert, eight American army staff were murdered (causing the 
choice to abort the mission). The operation merely boosted Iranian 
hatred towards the United States rather than ending the hostage crisis. 
(Sasan Fayazmanesh, 2008) 
The expression of this emerging trend in American politics was the 
announcement of what later became known as the "Carter Doctrine" in 
the State of the Union speech of 1980. President Jimmy Carter stated 
clearly, in the address, "An attempt by any outside force to gain control 
of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as a harassment on the 
national security interests of the United States of America and will be 
defeated by any necessary means, including military force." (Meghan L. 
O'Sullivan,, 2003, p. 12) 
In the moment Reagan administration, America provided Iraq with 
material support in its war against Iran. President Reagan gave Iraq 
material support in his war against Iran soon after his victory in the 1980 
election in order to counter the new regime in Tehran. In his turn, 
Khomeini sought to export the Islamic revolution abroad, through 
creating Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and 
the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain and sending IRGC fighters 
to assist Hezbollah in Lebanon. One of the reasons that the US tried 
secretly supplying weapons to Iran in the mid-1980s was to persuade 
Iran to release hostages that were taken by Iran supported group. 
However, at several junctures, especially in the early 1990s during 
Hashemi-Rafsanjani's presidency and during Khatami's presidency in the 
early 2000s, Iran tried to follow a more pragmatic foreign policy towards 
United States. Iranian attitudes towards US worsened especially after the 
US support for Iraq during war with Iran. Several incidents linked to U.S. 
participation in the Iran-Iraq War were particularly crucial in affecting 
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even Iranians who resisted the Islamic government that the U.S. was as 
bad as Khomeini claimed. The U.S. enhanced sanctions against Iran 
after Iraq's invasion of Iran. 
In the time of conflict, the US directly involved in enabling Iraq use of 
chemical weapons and even providing the needed chemicals to Saddam 
Hussein's army. Since the United States' priority was to defeat Iran, the 
Reagan administration ignored a definitive investigation by the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) that found that Iraq regularly used 
mustard gas and nerve agents against Iran. Within a few years, this 
became a major continuing concern for Reagan's successors after the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, as fear of Iraqi chemical weapons caused great 
and continual trouble to the planning of U.S. operations against Iraq. This 
is just another example suggests that the diplomatic process should be 
privileged over military alternatives in US policy towards unfriendly 
states, since there is no guarantee of the ongoing allegiance of those 
nations or groups conducting military activities at the behest of the US 
government. Hence, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait introduced US direct 
involvement into the region. 
President Reagan instructed the State Department to put Iran on its list 
of State Sponsors of Terrorism in 1984, with the result that the US would 
try to ban global economic help to Iran and discourage Iranian efforts to 
export military equipment. In 1987-1988 military engagement between 
the US and Iran worsened. Reagan re-imposed the Iranian import 
embargo and prohibited Iran from selling dual-use products. While the 
US formally supported Iraq in its conflict with Iran and supplied 
substantial assistance to Iraq, the US aimed to contain both states while 
also selling arms to them. As many Iranian arms systems were of U.S. 
origin, President Reagan saw a chance to balance Iraqi authority by 
enabling Iran to sell secret guns (anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles) in 
- 37 - 
 
return for Iranian pressure on Hezbollah to release American hostages 
in Lebanon, despite the classification of Iran as a terrorist sponsor by the 
State Department. US military operations against Iran, however, did not 
discourage the people of Iran from supporting the Islamic Republic. The 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 leaded to suspend US interest in Iran. 
(Greg Ryan, 2018, pp. 105-106) 
In 1980, when Saddam Hussein was obviously given approval by the 
Carter administration to invade Iran, most of the policy was designed at 
releasing U.S. hostages and helping to defeat the Islamic government. 
In the 1980s, as formulated by several Reagan administration officials, 
the strategy of dual containment developed into guaranteeing that neither 
Iran nor Iraq would win the war. Therefore, America provided intelligence 
to both sides, but mostly to Saddam Hussein through closing its eyes to 
the use of chemical weapons in the war by Hussein and even supplied 
Iraq with the chemical agents needed to produce such weapons. 
Ultimately, when it became apparent that Hussein could be defeated, the 
US involved Iran directly in the war. Because of that awful eight-year war 
was that it cost the lives of an estimated one million Iranians and Iraqis 
and ruined both countries' economies. (Sasan Fayazmanesh, 2008, pp. 
13-17) 
Israel followed the same strategy of dual containment as well. Thereby, 
in the 1980s, dual containment for both the US and Israel supposed 
assisting Iran and Iraq destroy each other in a costly and prolonged war. 
The only distinction in strategy was that while the US preferred Iran to be 
destroyed first, Israel desired the contrary. 
Despite the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States still confronted 
some significant obstacles to its interests overseas hence, its 
policymakers tried to articulate a new global position for it. The Persian 
Gulf stayed an area where global instability and unrest could bring about 
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major financial disturbance and threaten the emergence of new conflicts. 
During that era, the complicated issue of American relations with Iraq and 
Iran kept its vitality, both hostile to the United States and regarded as 
threatening to American interests. Thus, dual containment was 
formulated as a strategy, which was one of the major foreign policies of 
its era, towards rogue states by American policymakers. (Alex Edwards 
, 2014, p. 26) 
After the war and especially during the Clinton administration, the 
practice of dual containment became a subject of enforcing US sanctions 
against Iran and UN sanctions against Iraq. During this period, it was 
expected that economic hardship in both countries would bring about 
popular uprisings, and this, in turn, would lead to the defeat of the two 
governments in favour of US-Israeli friendly regimes. Consequently, dual 
containment became synonymous mainly with economic deprivation. 
(The Guardian , Saturday, March 4, 2000) 
The policy known as "dual containment" was created to address threats 
such as Iraq and Iran, which were recognized as significant threats to 
America's regional interests, by isolating both nations regionally, cutting 
them off from the global financial and trading system, and promoting 
regime change in Iraq. The policy directed to the continuation of U.N. 
sanctions against Iraq and to convince great powers such as Europe, 
Russia and Japan to restrict Iran access to global capital and weapons 
markets. (F. Gregory Gause, March/April 1994) 
An officer of the National Security Council (NSC) officially launched this 
policy, which was intended to suppress the impact of both Iran and Iraq 
across the Middle East, to the globe in a lecture in 1993. It continued 
mainly until the end of President Bill Clinton's term in office and is 
noteworthy for several factors. First, the strategy itself continues to be 
somewhat overlooked, launched after the events of the 1991 conflict over 
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Kuwait and before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Second, 
it is an outstanding overview of post-Cold War US international 
policymaking. Finally, its execution and the course it took with respect to 
Iran reflected to the US strategy towards post-1979 Iran in particular and 
the Persian Gulf in general. Because of the highly antagonistic turn of the 
US and Iran relation since 1979, the dual containment policy 
encapsulates some of the most contentious characteristics of American 
strategy in the Middle East. (Alex Edwards , 2014, p. 14) 
Therefore, the 1980s and especially the 1990s saw a strong increase in 
the American military footprint of the region with the approval of a 
multitude of regional nations that lacked the capacity to safeguard 
themselves against Iraq or Iran. 
It was a mix of regional and international variables that concurrently 
"pushed" and "pulled" the United States into close political and military 
engagement with the Persian Gulf in the latter half of the 20th century. 
After the collapse of the USSR, all these factors remained important with 
the important exception of the acknowledged Soviet threat to the world's 
oil supplies. Nonetheless, the United States continued to be connected 
to its traditional approach "to prevent any state from gaining dominance 
in the Persian Gulf." ( John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, 2007, p. 
281) 
Accordingly, when George H. W. Bush came to power in 1989, because 
of its oil reserves, the Persian Gulf remained a region of critical 
importance. Consequently, Bush chose to maintain the previous strategy 
of balancing against Iran by continuing to maintain the earlier developed 
relationship with Saddam Hussein's Iraq under Reagan, supposedly in 
the hope of moderating Iraq's foreign policy. ( George Bush and Brent 
Scowcroft, 1998, pp. 305-306) 
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American dual containment policy was a relative success in the scenario 
of Iraq. Although Saddam Hussein stayed in authority, by the end of 2001 
his ability to threaten American interests in the Persian Gulf was minimal. 
Apart from Iraq, the U.S. containment of Iran was not conducted through 
the UNSC. Unlike Iraq, Iran had not launched any brutal conflicts that 
drew the rage of the world to generate feasible "peace enforcement" 
procedures of the UN Charter. Although the other coastal nations, 
especially Saudi Arabia, still wished American safety, maintained 
defence cooperation with the United States, and viewed Iran primarily as 
a rival, they also reacted to Iranian attempts to restore ties during the 
1990s. (Arjomand, 2009, p. 157) 
Iran-Iraq non-proliferation Act of 1992 characterized with the beginning 
of US sanctions on Iran in the 1990s. Despite its name, the act was 
directed mainly to Iran, considering that at the moment Iraq was under 
the most extensive embargo ever enforced by the UN. (Hiro, 2001, p. 
201) 
Some of the toughest sanctions against Iran characterized President 
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s period. In 1995, significant sanctions 
imposed by the United States were a couple of executive actions issued 
by President Clinton, numbers 12957 and 12959. The Iran and Libya 
Sanctions Act (ILSA) heavily affected American-Iranian relations in 1996 
as well. 
It is not surprising that, despite US pressure, the United Kingdom, 
France, Germany and the rest of the EU decided to follow their own 
"critical dialog" strategy to Iran. That strategy consisted of encouraging 
trade and other relations with Iran to generate interdependence and give 
Iran a vested interest in the status quo while promoting dialog about the 
problematic behaviour of Iran. The EU Commission threatened the 
United States with retaliation in case of any sanction towards European 
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companies. One of the containing US policy on Iran was limiting Iranian 
access to global organizations ' funding and debt restructuring. 
Russia agreed to build a nuclear power plant near the Iranian town of 
Bushehr as soon as August 1992 and to supply enriched uranium fuel to 
20 percent. Two years later, Russia and the Iranian Atomic Energy 
Authority signed an $800 million agreement to construct two light-water 
nuclear reactors and generators, which led to threats by senior figures in 
US Congress to cut off aid to Russia over the issue. China had also been 
subjected to American pressure as another of Iran's international 
partners on its nuclear development programme. 
Above-mentioned measures make one thing obvious that they were all 
commonly unilateral measures taken by the United States. (Alex 
Edwards , 2014, pp. 60-65) 
The impetus for reconciliation between the US and Iran had been 
Mohammad Khatami's surprise election to Iran's presidency in May 1997, 
when it appeared that American-Iranian relations had reached a nadir 
after ILSA had passed and other sanctions had been imposed. Under 
Khatami, several attempts were made by the administration to "break the 
ice" with Iran such as Iranian president’s interview calling for a "dialog of 
civilizations" with the United States at CNN in January 1988. In his turn, 
US ambassador to the UN and Clinton’s second secretary of state 
Madeleine Albright responded positively. (Nikki R. Keddie, 2003, p. 272) 
Finally, in March 2000, Albright issued more specific apologies for 
American participation in the 1953 coup, provided assistance with the 
unfreezing of Iranian assets in the United States, and announced the 
lifting of restrictions on imports into the United States of certain Iranian 
products. Despite these U.S. efforts to restore something similar to a 
publicly recognized dialog with Iran, there was no progress and the 
relations between the two nations kept its adversarial character since 
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several obvious reasons including as the presence of the US military in 
the Persian Gulf and Iran’s close relationship with Lebanese Hezbollah. 
(Alex Edwards , 2014, pp. 71-76) 
Relationships then halted due to resistance from Iranian conservatives 
and American preconditions for discussion, including modifications in 
Iran's policy on Israel, nuclear power, and terrorism support. 
With George W. Bush's election as the 43rd US president, US dialog and 
practice changed considerably. The peak of that shift was the outbreak 
of the September 11 terror attack when the U.S. president drew a line 
between "us and them," along with two other countries calling Iran "axis 
of evil." Defining the "War on Terrorism" as the U.S. geopolitical code 
and recognizing Iran as an enemy has further strengthened Iran-U.S. 
hostility. A definite confrontation between the two nations began with the 
election of Ahmadinejad as a president of Iran in 2005, particularly 
around Iran's nuclear program. Both nations regarded each other an 
"enemy" and attempted to build their coalitions around the globe. Those 
developments lead relations to more critical phase. (Ph.D.candidate 
Saeid Naji, March 2011, pp. 7-8) 
The United States used Iran’s nuclear program, and characteristic of a 
‘terrorism supporter’ as a “justification” for The US measures to gain a 
consensus against Iran among other nations. Therefore, President Bush 
had declared at this stage that Washington would not “tolerate the 
construction of a nuclear weapon” by Iran. (David E. Sanger, 2003) 
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III CHAPTER Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and 
Afterwards 
3.1. Reconciliation? Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action  
 
The origins of the JCPOA and its circumstances can be understood 
under the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguard 
mechanism implemented by the IAEA. The development of Iranian 
nuclear technology originated in the 1970s when, the U.S. Atoms for 
Peace program began to assist Iran, in the moment of the Shah regime. 
In 1968, Iran signed the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapon state and in 1970 ratified the NPT 
(Jonas Schneider & Oliver Thränert, 2014 April). The NPT requires every 
non-nuclear-weapon state (all countries party to the NPT except China, 
France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) to enter into 
a safeguard contract with the IAEA covering all of its nuclear material in 
all peaceful nuclear activities. 
In 2003, the IAEA Director-General revealed that Iran failed to fulfil its 
commitments in many respects. In 2005, the Board of Governors found 
Iran in breach of its safeguards agreement and urged Iran. Parallel to 
this, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom involved in talks with 
Iran that resulted to the suspension of enriched uranium production in 
2003. Iran shortly broke this treaty, but in 2004 Iran and France, 
Germany, the United Kingdom and the European Union (EU) reached a 
new contract. It called for the provisional suspension of uranium 
enrichment while pursuing additional ways of resolving the nuclear issue. 
(Michael D. Rosenthal, 2016) 
The IAEA confirmed this suspension, but Iran started enhanced uranium 
manufacturing in early 2006. EU 3 together with China, Russia and the 
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United States established the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the 
United Nations Security Council negotiated the deal with Germany which 
were called the P5 + 1 together) in June 2006. The Security Council 
adopted its first resolution on the following month, July 2006, calling for 
Iran to suspend uranium enrichment and processing. 
Therefore, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on 
February 4, 2006. The UN Security Council enacted Resolution 1696 in 
reaction to an IAEA report. Nevertheless, Iran persisted to increase its 
capacity for uranium enrichment and failed to follow the other measures 
requested by the Security Council, including enabling the IAEA to 
reconstruct the past of Iran's nuclear program. The Security Council, in 
turn, adopted a number of measures imposing sanctions with growing 
seriousness. (Michael D. Rosenthal, 2016, pp. 98-115) The UN Security 
Council subsequently adopted six resolutions requiring full cooperation 
with the IAEA and the suspension of all uranium-enrichment-related 
operations on Iran's nuclear program from 2006 to 2010. To pressure 
Iran, resolutions established to cease enrichment activities and impose 
sanctions on the transfer of nuclear and missile technology. 
The first three of these were directed at limiting Iran's nuclear program, 
however Resolution 1929 mandated wider financial and economic 
sanctions on Iran such as prohibiting foreign investment in Iran's energy 
industry, limiting trade credit with Iran, restricting arms sales to Iran, and 
preventing financial dealings with Iran's banks. 
The years of 2011-2012 marked as the toughest phase of sanctions 
against Iran, since the United States and the EU imposed sanction on oil, 
the central bank of Iran and access to SWIFT that highly devastated the 
economy of Iran. (The international system for transferring funds). 
(Sayed Hossein Mussavian, Mohammed Mehdi Mussavian, 02 Jan 
2018,) 
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The nuclear concern in Iran dominated at the Bush administration. The 
question of whether or not the nuclear program was intended for national 
energy reasons or whether it contained a component of covert weapons 
stayed mainly unanswered despite strict and ongoing IAEA inspections. 
One of the wider problems highlighted by the Iranian nuclear program is 
the willingness of many non-nuclear weapons countries to have access 
to nuclear energy for national reasons. 
The deadlock between the relations of the two states had been 
significantly influenced from historical background. Both sides had 
mistrust and suspicious which were deeply rooted to historical 
experiences such as the 1952 coup against Mohammad Mossadeq and 
the 1979 American hostage crisis. 
The legal framework for the Iran policy of the Bush administration was 
made up of several bills and resolutions adopted by both Congress 
chambers. In 2003, the U.S. Senate enacted the Iran Democracy Act, 
which explicitly indicated that supporting transparent, complete 
democracy in Iran was U.S. policy. The 2006 Iran Freedom Support 
Act aimed' to hold Iran's present government responsible for its 
threatening conduct and to support a democratic transition in Iran.' ( 
Kumuda Simpson, 2016, p. 66) 
Tensions between the United States and Iran increased from 2003 to 
early 2006. However, Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, Iran's top 
diplomat, indicated in May 2007 that Iran is "willing to talk" to the United 
States. In May 2008, the US vetoed the plan for bombing Iranian nuclear 
facilities by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. (Jonathan Steele, 2008) 
In November 2009, Barack Obama was elected as a new American 
president and inherited political confusion that started from 2001. The 
desire to negotiate straight with the Iranian regime without precondition 
was one of the most significant political shift in the US strategy. The most 
- 46 - 
 
challenging problem to address in any future negotiations would be the 
capacity of Iran to enrich uranium and thus possibly master the entire 
nuclear fuel cycle. ( Kumuda Simpson, 2016, pp. 94-96) 
The election of Obama had given impetus to a radical new chance to 
progress ties between America and Iran. Even his presidential campaign 
Obama declared his desire on direct diplomatic talks with Tehran. Obama 
also knew that a good deal of preparation would be crucial before 
negotiations. 
Obama's second term in office was characterized as a major change in 
the U.S.-Iran relationship. During this period, the Geneva Process with 
the P5 + 1 and the Joint Action Plan (JPOA), which represents the first 
formal agreement between the United States and Iran in 34 years, sought 
to address many of the remaining issues concerning Iran's nuclear 
program. (Blair, David, 24 November 2013) 
The nuclear agreement also had a disruptive impact on the traditional 
regional partners of America, especially Saudi Arabia and some of the 
Gulf States, who are against Iran's increasing regional influence. With 
the election of Hassan Rouhani in Iran and his apparent desire to reopen 
nuclear negotiations, this concern, shared by other GCC participants 
took on a growing concern. 
The election of Hassan Rouhani in Iran brought the Ahmadinejad's eight 
years of unsuccessful nuclear talks end. After hundred days of Rouhani's 
election, Iran and the P5+1 achieved an interim nuclear treaty or a Joint 
Action Plan that certify the election of President Rouhani as significant 
factor in enabling this negotiated settlement. 
Apart from Ahmadinejad, in foreign policy, President Rouhani has 
continuously exhibited pragmatism, including his behaviour on the 
nuclear dossier. He suggested the most practical and realistic packages 
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to the EU3, which failed due to the unrealistic zero enrichment policy of 
the US, during his moment as Iran's chief negotiator from 2003 to 2005. 
The Joint Plan of Action and the ensuing negotiations ultimately led to a 
Framework Agreement in April 2015, followed by a final agreement in 
July 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In general, Joint Plan 
of Action paved the way to formal negotiations toward comprehensive 
agreement between Iran and P5+1 countries. Consequently, after the 20 
months of negotiations parties agreed for the final agreement in April 
2015. After 3 months, the agreement was confirmed. (Daniel Joyner, 
2016, pp. 71-72) 
Following the 2015 Iran nuclear accord, defined as the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), there was a lot of discussion 
about whether the US sanctions policy led Iran to the negotiating table, 
Iran’s breakout approach took the United States to the table, or other 
geopolitical reasons played a part. There are several major factors, such 
as leadership changes in each state and a shifting geopolitical context, 
paved the way for the nuclear deal. The most crucial factor that made the 
agreement available was Obama's transition from the traditional US 
policy that emphasizes of no enrichment in Iran to no nuclear bomb. The 
geopolitical scenario and the numerous crises in the Middle East forced 
Iran and the P5+1 to rethink their previous nuclear confrontational 
strategies, create a more realistic approach, and find methods to resolve 
the nuclear crisis through negotiation rather than conflict. The Obama 
administration acknowledged that the more the U.S. and Iran could 
arrange on regional issues with each other, the less likely it was that 
America would have to put additional forces on the ground in the Middle 
East. 
Europe’s security threats developed a powerful intention in Europe to 
resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis peacefully, to regain market share in the 
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Iranian economy, and to collaborate with Iran on Middle East crisis 
leadership. The Eurozone crises, multiple terrorist attacks in different 
European countries, and the millions of refugees, besides, the EU’s 
desire to diversify its gas sources and decrease its dependence on 
Russian gas supplies thanks to Iranian gas resources consists those type 
security threats. 
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action had significant consequences 
for global powers and Iran, and directly affected the bilateral US-Iran 
relationship, regional security conditions and US national politics. (Sayed 
Hossein Mussavian, Mohammed Mehdi Mussavian, 02 Jan 2018,, pp. 
169-175) 
Some scholars characterized JCPOA as a win-win deal for both sides 
due to several considerations. Iran had been subject to serious sanctions 
of multiple types, both bilateral and multilateral. Sanctions resulted 
devastated economy and as well as influenced its foreign relations. The 
objectives of Iran were to enhance its economy, normalize its oil and gas 
trade, develop its infrastructure, and normalize its political relations 
globally.  In terms of these factors, a diplomatic arrangement was the 
best way to show its true intentions that Iran was not interested in 
creating nuclear arms and attempted only to create peaceful civil atomic 
technology, in order to remove suspicions and create trust. 
(H.A.Feiveson, August 12, 2015) 
In the same time, The United States and the other states included to 
P5+1 understood that sanctions, which were designed to compel Iran to 
abandon its nuclear program, were not quite successful. Moreover, the 
military choice was quite unrealistic, as the other members of the Security 
Council were not prepared to assist a U.S. attack on Iran. In addition, this 
was true that sanctions resulted with counter-affect. It became apparent 
that Iran's reaction to nearly every sanction was to raise the amount and 
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capacity of its enrichment and heavy water programs. These factors 
clarify why the Obama administration embraced the EU3 + 3 alternative 
of negotiating an agreement that would guarantee a peaceful civilian 
nuclear program for Iran and would close all paths towards armament. 
All these considerations, clearly explain why the Obama administration 
supported the EU3 + 3 option of negotiating an agreement. Iran gained 
from deal as well, because all unilateral and multilateral measures were 
lifted, Iran's right to enrichment and heavy-water activity respected, the 
global community cooperated with Iran on peaceful nuclear technologies, 
and Iran's foreign relations enhanced dramatically. (H.A.Feiveson, 
August 12, 2015) 
Consequently, while JCPOA is not an optimal accord for the United 
States and is limited to concerns linked only to Iran's nuclear capabilities, 
it created important constraints on Iranian nuclear activity, created a 
comprehensive and thorough inspection system, and provided for a rapid 
re-establishment of sanctions whether Iran violates the agreement. (Greg 
Ryan, 2018, pp. 25-28) Things considered, the JCPOA treaty was 
effective in attaining what it set out to achieve in terms of restricting Iran's 
nuclear weapons ability. 
As one analyst pointed out, without an accord, the region would probably 
see: an extended Iranian atomic program; an erosion of wide 
international sanctions without any advantage to regional and global 
safety; increased potential for military conflict; and the loss of chances to 
work on significant fields of common concern to Iran and the United 
States' ( Kumuda Simpson, 2016, p. 135). 
It is obvious that, there will always be competing interests between the 
US and Iran. What is essential is that both nations find methods to 
regulate their most hazardous regions of dispute and neutralize them. 
That is what JCPOA had done. In addition, one of the most deficient arms 
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control agreements in history is the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 
or JCPOA. 
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3.2. Iran Foreign Policy after the fall of the Deal 
 
Donald Trump pledged to "renegotiate" the July 2015 Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action, generally known as the Iran nuclear deal, 
during the 2016 U.S. presidential election campaign since he claimed 
that the agreement does not discourage Iran from building nuclear 
weapons, and in fact makes it easier in the future for Iran to go nuclear 
in some respects. The mere implementation of the present agreement 
could undermine the interests of America in the Middle East and its 
worldwide non-proliferation strategy. (Kroenig, 11 Jan 2018., pp. 7-9) 
However, JCPOA had been implemented since in January 2016, the U.S. 
Congress and the Obama and Trump administrations have continually 
enforced sanctions, citing human rights issues, terrorism, missile testing, 
and regional differences as their justifications. (Changiz M. Varzi, 2016) 
Since Donald Trump took office, in Washington he had witnessed 
constant attempts to reverse the JCPOA and amend the Iran policy of 
the Obama administration. Trump labelled the JCPOA wildly as "one of 
the worst deals" and “disastrous deal” in history and took numerous 
measures intended to scuttle it. (JANA WINTER, 2017) The main issue 
with Iran's nuclear accord is that it does not address the issue it was 
intended to address since the nuclear deal only delays Iran's desire to 
create nuclear weapons rather than stops. In announcing the withdrawal 
on May 2018, Trump justify his decision with the inability of accord to 
tackle Iran’s ballistic missile program and its regional proxy warfare, 
claiming that several ending provisions in JCPOA would allow Iran to 
develop a bomb in future. 
From a perspective of Trump administration, increasing pressure on 
Tehran will limit the destabilizing influence of Iran in the region. Over 
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moment, Washington can utilize the pressure to push Iran back to the 
negotiating table. That strategy is understood by statement of State 
Secretary Mike Pompeo on June 2019 as the recent sanctions were 
imposed: “The only path forward is for Iran to negotiate a comprehensive 
deal that addresses the full range of its destabilizing behaviours. Until it 
does, our campaign of diplomatic isolation and maximum economic 
pressure will continue. When the Iranian regime decides to forgo violence 
and meet our diplomacy with diplomacy, it knows how to reach us”. 
(MICHAEL R. POMPEO, JUNE 24, 2019) 
President Trump sought a broader deal with Iran that goes beyond the 
nuclear issue to include the development of Tehran's missiles, supporting 
militant groups, intervening in crises in the Middle East and abusing 
human rights. The US and Iran have had hostile ties since the 1979 
revolution, however the tension has escalated with the decision of 
Donald Trump regarding withdrawal from nuclear deal in May 2018. The 
withdrawal that is called “a serious mistake” by Barack Obama created 
great concern in Iran because of its economic effect. 
After the withdrawal decision of Donald Trump, Iranian president Hassan 
Rouhani reacted that development immediately and stated  his intention 
to negotiate with the other parties to the agreement, Britain, China, 
France, Germany, and Russia in the case of preservation of Iran’s 
national interest. It is obvious that the treaty was designed to give 
financial liberty for Iranians; indeed the nuclear agreement had not 
fulfilled its pledge. But what really undermined the potential benefits of 
the treaty were the American sanctions that remained intact despite the 
treaty and that continued to discourage not only any significant bank 
functioning in Iran, but also discourage nearly all ordinary economic 
transactions, depriving Iran of much-needed credit and foreign 
investment. (Thomas Erdbrink, 2018) 
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Another reason behind that escalation of tension is Trump’s describing 
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist group in April 2019. 
It seems to be the defining moment for a sequence of operations of 
military and intelligence. (Robin Wright, 2019) 
Robin Wright in his analysis namely “The origins and future of the Iran 
crisis” identified 3 intersecting flashpoints of that crisis:  The key dispute 
over Iran's nuclear program; the attacks on six foreign tankers between 
12 May and 13 June 2019; and the shooting down of an advanced U.S. 
surveillance drone on 20 June. (Robin Wright, 2019) 
On June 2019, President Trump sanctioned Iran’s supreme leader, 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and any official in his office claiming that the 
Supreme Leader of Iran is one who ultimately is guilty for the hostile 
conduct of the regime. It shows in its turn that, Donald Trump came 
officially calling for a change of regime. Although the "maximum 
pressure" campaign by the Trump administration, Iran's reaction has not 
been optimistic and has taken on a more aggressive reaction, and 
conflicts across the region have escalated. 
To understand the current situation in Iran, it would be great to look back 
to 2012 the last time the nation faced such concerted sanctions for 
competitive analysis. In that time the United States, the United Nations 
and the European Union acted jointly and therefore, Iran’s economy 
decreased by 1.9 percent and its oil exports fell by more than 1 million 
barrels per day. 
Currently, there are some major differences between where Iran finds 
itself today compared with 2012. To begin with, this moment, the United 
States is the primary force pushing sanctions against Iran. The European 
Union is less committed to the U.S. plan and there is no significant U.N. 
sanctions regime, as was the case before the JCPOA. (Stratfor 
Enterprises, 2018) Together with new Congressional and administrative 
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sanctions against Iran, Trump's strategic goal of destroying Iran's 
economy is a unilateral manoeuvre aimed at undermining a multilateral 
accord. (Fred Kaplan, 2016) 
Iran simply cannot stave off a crisis in the wake of such heavy U.S. 
sanctions. However, the economy of Iran still has a stronger basis than 
it did in 2012. Unemployment is about 11 per cent— 3 per cent smaller 
than in 2012. And total official reserves are at about $130 billion, offering 
the state a lot more of a cushion than it had in 2012 when revenues 
floated around $100 billion. Most significantly, however, there is a fresh 
point of political coherence in Tehran, which implies that the state will be 
both prepared and able to undertake reform initiatives. The Iranian 
government has been increasingly dedicated to establishing common 
ground that they agree on the need to stabilize the economy for the sake 
of national security and differ from 2012 case; Iran's state is much more 
unified and will only develop as US pressure intensifies. Iran 
concentrates on introducing financial reforms and focuses on being 
prepared for renewed sanctions. Besides, in the absence of the 
agreement, Iran's state places more emphasis on cultivating national 
manufacturing and exporting non-oil products, which are likely to include 
saffron, pistachios and plastics. 
When President Hassan Rouhani came into office in 2003, he 
concentrates to increase non-oil exports; indeed statistics proves its 
increase. Implementing shipping contingency plans, seeking nations 
ready to risk U.S. secondary sanctions for port entry are part of Iran's 
strategy against U.S. policy. Likely alternatives include ports like Basra 
in southern Iraq, Pakistan, Oman, and Qatar. Iran has been operating 
more actively to solidify arrangements with them due to the United States 
left the JCPOA. However, smuggling through these states will be harder 
now than it was in 2012. (Stratfor Enterprises, 2018) 
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In that view, Qatar is probably reluctant to collaborate with Iran as it seeks 
to stay in the positive graces of the United States amid the continuing 
conflict with other countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Oman is 
now trying to restore confidence with the Trump administration as the 
tougher Iran strategy of the Trump administration risks the pipeline and 
other economic agreements with the Islamic Republic. Furthermore, 
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's visit to Muscat in October 
2018 and an arrangement in March 2019 enabling the U.S. military higher 
access to Omani ports may have been openings to attempt. America is 
also keen on keeping healthy ties with Oman and demanding that Oman 
be truly neutral on the Iran issue, both politically and economically. With 
assistance from Oman, Kuwait has prompted mediation attempts to 
settle the dispute. Indeed, the claim regarding Oman's neutral foreign 
policy in the Middle East is fundamentally incorrect, when Omani 
authorities continue to argue that sanctions are the incorrect strategy and 
that engagement with Iran is the best route forward. (Jonathan Schanzer 
& Nicole Salter, May 2019, pp. 21-28) 
Since the overthrow of the Sunni dictator Saddam Hussein in 2003 and 
the rise of Shiite forces to power in Baghdad, diplomatic ties between 
Iraq and Iran, which clashed in a war between 1980 and 1988, have 
become strategic. Iran is using its close links with Iraq’s current regime 
to circumvent the sanctions. On March 2019, Iran’s president, Hassan 
Rouhani, visited Baghdad for the first time. After a meeting with Iraqi 
Prime Minister, the two officials declared trade expansion deals, a rail 
line between the two nations, and the removal of travel constraints. 
Common concerns such as ensuring their 900-mile boundary; restricting 
re-emergence of ISIS and other extremist groups; cooperating on energy 
issues; enhancing economic integration bringing these two nations 
together. In addition, a truth involves Iran more than ever. Iraq, in turn, 
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has depended on paramilitary assistance from Iran in the fight against 
the ISIS. Researcher Sarhang Hamasaeed concluded in his research 
that pressing Iraq to choose sides, or abandoning it altogether, will only 
backfire. (Sarhang Hamasaeed, 2019) 
Iran will endeavour, most of all, to avoid its economic strain from 
translating into currency problems for its population. The worse the 
economy gets, the more likely it will cause increased income inequality 
and commodity prices. The state will ensure that the cost of products is 
kept in check, as food prices and unemployment were the main drivers 
of demonstration and unrest in Iran. (Stratfor Enterprises, 2018) 
All of these measurements have one characteristic is that strategy of the 
government against US policy is designed for short –term benefit, not 
long-term. The Iranian state expects that its resistance economy will be 
able to maintain the country's survival until Trump and his administration 
no longer operate Washington. 
The distinction is profound between the U.S. and the other five member 
states to the 2015 nuclear deal— Britain, China, France, Germany, and 
Russia. The transatlantic split over Iran has been deeper than any other 
problem since the end of World War II. At the same moment, many 
foreign companies in allied countries have chosen to prevent or withdraw 
from deals with Iran for fear of being sanctioned by the United States. 
(Robin Wright, 2019) Recently, France, Germany and Britain established 
a barter mechanism- the Instrument in Support of Trade 
Exchange (INSTEX), a financial mechanism designed to safeguard 
Tehran-Europe's trade links from US bans, in an effort to maintain the 
nuclear treaty alive. (DW news, 2019) However, it is only for food and 
medicine, which are already not subject to U.S. penalties. 
Several nations, including U.S. allies, began to export Iranian oil under 
waivers given by the Trump administration and Iran in its turn continued 
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to meet its obligations, right after from withdrawal of the United States 
from comprehensive agreement. Recently the U.S. finished the waivers 
in order to bringing Iran's oil exports to zero. However, how much further 
Iranian oil revenues will drop is not clear. China has insisted on the ideal 
legality of its trade with Iran and that the US has no authority to interfere. 
Turkey said it could not cut a neighbour’s links. (BBC News, 2019) For 
economic and geopolitical purposes, Turkey, China, India and potentially 
several European allies will seek methods to operate around U.S. 
sanctions. (Richard Sokolsky, Aron David Miller, 2019) 
The announcement of bringing Iran’s oil revenues zero was the turning 
point for Iran in terms of bounding to commitments of the accord as long 
as the other parties to the JCPOA were in breach of theirs. However, Iran 
surpassed the agreed limits in July 2019 then started to enrich uranium 
to a greater level, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's foreign minister, said 
these JCPOA's gradual breaches were correctable in the case of 
European compliance. (Zachary Laub, 2019) 
The Trump administration can lead to serious pain to Iran, but it cannot 
cause massive internal unrest leading to the regime's collapse or a 
fundamental change in Iran's regional policy. (Richard Sokolsky, Aron 
David Miller, 2019) 
Iran took a direction toward self-sufficiency in all areas, which was 
designed to overcome the sanctions by America. (PressTV, 2019) 
Indeed, sanctioning Iran provide a chance for economic reforms to be 
implemented in order to achieve greater self-sufficiency. Historically, 
since 1979, Iran has been subject to sanctions that were relieved by the 
signing of JCPOA in 2015 until Trump chose to reintroduce them in 2018. 
The result makes the life of people more complicated and even 
endangers them, while the U.S. claims that its sanctions are designed 
against the state, not the people of Iran. Iran learned as a lesson from 
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being sanctioned that the reliance on the West will not yield economic 
prosperity. Iran will only be able to obtain self-sufficiency and stabilization 
by developing its inner capacities. Indeed, over the past eight years, 
Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has advocated 
addressing financial issues through what he calls a "resistance economy" 
and has put particular emphasis on promoting local sectors, 
manufacturing and products for the past three years. Iran learned to 
transform sanctions and economic isolation into opportunity due to 
growing "resistance economy". Although there are many products of this 
increasing "Resistance Economy," this does not mean that nothing has 
altered in Iran since the sanctions have been extended. Iran is not self-
sufficient in all areas at the moment, and its economy remains dependent 
on oil revenues (although not to the level it was under previous 
governments). The sanctions have posed Iran with many challenges 
when it comes to importing the technology required and other vital 
commodities. Rouhani compared the effect of the sanctions on the 
hardships generated by the 1980s ' eight-year conflict between Iran and 
Iraq. Iran certainly has no way but to strengthen its domestic economies 
and national abilities in an attempt to undermine the sanctions. (Karim 
Sharara, 2019) 
With less dependence on oil revenues (with Iran preparing to cease its 
reliance on oil entirely) and enhanced dependence on national 
manufacturing, Iran should be far better off in the coming years. The 
renewed sanctions regime, despite the present hardships, provides Iran 
a fresh chance to continue that trend. 
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СONCLUSION 
To start, this thesis attempted to answer the question “How does Iran as 
a regional power cope with the US’s unilateral sanctions?” as well as the 
two more specific sub-questions. 
In the first chapter, a look was taken at the theoretical lens to the rise of 
the regional powers, its substantial consequences both locally and 
globally and the consideration of established great powers in that 
moment. Neorealism was chosen as the adequate theory due to it helps 
to answer research questions regarding states’ behaviour. 
Therefore, regional powers can be seen as potential great powers over 
time and that was regarded as significant developments, which directly 
affect the current international relations and may challenge the reigning 
order. In here, the will of rising power should be taken into consideration 
as a key point. Ensuring their own security is the most central issue of 
the states in international relations. Different versions of realism indicate 
that states should act in a way that above all else ensures their safety. 
Security importance and methods of maintaining safety have been 
expressed in the following segment of the chapter and analysed 
comparatively. Balancing, bandwagoning and bargaining were 
separately examined as a strategy of states. The theoretical analysed 
illustrated that bargaining, as a state tactic could be beneficial for both 
sides. Bargaining model, in turn, requires bargaining power that defines 
the relative power of the sides in a situation to exert impact over one 
another. As consequences, in the process of negotiation, parties try to 
increase their bargaining chances for gaining more benefit through 
deterrence model or increasing their self-sufficiency as consequences of 
bargaining, respectively as Iran case. 
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Accordingly, this framework reflected in first chapter, also provided the 
ability to conclude how regional powers respond the threat by great 
powers and vice versa as well. 
The following chapter described the historical background of U.S.-Iran 
relations before and after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, respectively, and 
the beginning of U.S. containment policy towards Iran. 
The deadlock between the two countries' relationship had been conside
rably shaped from historical background. Reasons behind revolution 
were analysed. Since major parts of the Iranian population had not been 
pleased with the Shah's regime, the revolution had been inevitable. After 
the fall of the US backed regime, Khomeini succeeded in consolidating 
the authority around him and established his theocratic system. In 
particular, the current Islamic Republic had an anti-western foreign policy 
that attempted to distribute its revolutionary ideology throughout the 
region. 
In the last chapter, firstly, reconciliation of relations, the origins of JCPOA 
and its circumstances were examined. For several years, Iran's economy 
has been seriously affected by sanctions imposed by the international 
community on the uranium enrichment activity. 
The lesson, which Iran learned from 40 years of economic blockade, 
were analysed. This, therefore, instructed Iran not only to survive, but to 
grow independently, transformed Iranians from customers to 
entrepreneurs. Sanctions have significantly affected the general 
framework that hinders Iran's development and growth as part of the 
international system. (Fozia Jan, 3 April 2016, pp. 103-104) 
There are several significant factors, such as shifts in leadership in each 
side, and a changing geopolitical environment paved the way for the 
nuclear agreement. The accord was followed by twelve years of 
escalation and negotiation in which each party expanded its bargaining 
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power and gained a deep understanding of where the other party would 
or would not compromise. 
In the analytical part of the chapter, Iran’s foreign policy and strategy after 
the fall of deal were deeply researched. The tension has escalated with 
the decision of Donald Trump regarding withdrawal of the nuclear deal 
on May 2018. 
In conclusion, Iran had arose as a rational country to withstand external 
pressures, embargoes and international isolation and advanced in 
multiple areas to allow country to become self-sufficient. Rationally, both 
side are aware of the costly character of war. It should be noted that, 
generally, if countries understood the consequence of a conflict, they 
would prefer to agree to that result through bargaining without ever 
fighting. While each side likes a bargain to war, they still want the best 
deal for themselves. Therefore, they are pursuing a strategy of increasing 
their bargaining power. Iran’s self-sufficiency increases its bargaining 
chance since self-sufficiency, in turn, increases the level of surviving of 
Iran against containment policy of the US. As a bargaining tool, Iran uses 
its nuclear intentions. 
Until recently, Iran after the US withdrawal from accord, has pursued a 
strategy of “strategic patience”, and maintained the commitment of deal. 
This strategy was designed for short-term benefit with the thought that 
country could maintain its survival until Donald Trump left the office. 
However, Europe and other nations failing to compensate the loss of 
Iranian sanctions and Trump's new oil sanctions and designating Iran's 
Revolutionary Guard as a foreign terrorist organization resulted with 
demise of "strategic patience”. Iran is presently making the choice to 
break certain JCPOA limits and is actually pursuing the same strategy it 
used to achieve the JCPOA. Iran creates advantage with this way while 
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maintaining the negotiating door open if the administration demonstrates 
serious interest. 
In conclusion, the thesis illustrate how Iran as a regional power cope 
against the unilateral sanctions of the United States and therefore gave 
the answer to the research question and the specific sub-questions. 
Iran’s way to self-sufficiency and how this helps to get the opportunity of 
bargaining and in turn, to encounter sanctions. Neorealism was suited 
for the task and the analysis fit into the theoretical framework, as it 
highlights a wide variety of arguments that show how great powers react 
when global power shifts occur, and various strategies of rising powers. 
However, while the theory provided the instruments to try to achieve the 
goals of this thesis, the research project had its limitations. At points, 
owing to its continuing aspect, the research materials were insufficient 
and therefore output was somewhat limited. In addition, confidential 
character of some documents as well, restricted the potential that the 
research questions might have had. 
Nevertheless, the thesis presented useful insight into Iran's strategy 
against US containment policy, and further research on the subject could 
be pursued from a variety of perspectives. Neorealism is one of many 
concepts, and a similar case study would be possible with the others. A 
case study with different theoretical views, such as institutionalism or 
neoliberalism, would also be relevant. Overall, Iran is a subject that 
needs more research, since it is a recurring hotspot in the international 
system. Raised tensions in the international sphere regarding with the 
fall of nuclear deal made the research valuable better understanding the 
reasoning and motivations of states. Hence, more research into this topic 
is deserved, as Iran will continue to play an important role on the world 
stage in the future. 
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